Congressional Retirements, 1789-2024

Two centuries of members leaving the House, and the one thing the record will not say

Democracy’s Data

Last updated September 15, 2026 at 4:42p EDT

The election is how voters fire a member of Congress. That is the design the Constitution leans on: two-year terms, the whole House on the ballot every time, and a member who serves badly sent home.1 The sentence assumes that when a member leaves, the voters did the removing. Did they? That is a question a citizen has a stake in, because if the answer is no, then the check on the House is not the one the civics class describes.

The record can answer it, member by member. Between 2004 and 2022, 790 members left the House, and for each one the files say whether any voter was involved. 507 of them, 64 percent, never stood on a ballot they could have lost. Most departures from the modern House are chosen, not imposed, and the rest of this brief is about counting that honestly and asking what the choices signal.

The test

Using the membership rosters of the House, 1789 to 2025, joined to the federal record of who ran and how they did. Three files are stacked, and they are not equally good. Voteview’s member file is the machine-readable form of the official membership record: one row per member per Congress — the numbered two-year session that convenes after each House election, so the 118th Congress is the one that met in 2023 and 2024 — back to the First, maintained by political scientists at UCLA and downloadable at https://voteview.com/data. The Federal Election Commission’s (the FEC’s) Federal Elections compilations, 2004–2022, report every House candidate’s vote in the primary, the election each party holds to choose its nominee, and in the general election in November, compiled from the states’ official canvasses and downloadable at https://www.fec.gov/introduction-campaign-finance/election-results-and-voting-information/. Brookings’ Vital Statistics on Congress counts retirements and defeats back to 1946, and gives the derivation something independent to be checked against.

A roster is the only instrument that can hold this question. Leaving is a membership fact: a person served in Congress N and did not serve in Congress N+1, which the roster states for 118 consecutive Congresses with no inference at all. A returns file cannot see the member who never appears on a ballot, and that member is precisely the subject. The roster chapter introduces this record, what it was made for, and why most House turnover is invisible to election returns.

Source What Covering Kind
Voteview member file Every member of every Congress 1789 to 2025 Compiled by researchers, out of roll calls
FEC, Federal Elections Every House candidate, with primary and general votes 2004 to 2022 A federal agency’s own publication
Brookings, Vital Statistics on Congress Retirements, primary defeats, general defeats, counted 1946 to 2024 Compiled from other people’s counts

The data

Put the roster beside the candidate file and each departing member falls into one of four places:

What the files show What it is called
Not on any House ballot Did not seek re-election
On the primary ballot, not nominated Denied renomination
Nominated, lost in November Defeated in the general election
Nominated, won Re-elected

The first of those four is a residual, the category for what is left over, and residuals are where the trouble is. A graceful retiree, a member resigning under indictment, and a member quitting ahead of an expected defeat all land in it together. Deaths can be pulled out, because the roster records a death year; Senate runs can be pulled out, because those members appear on the FEC’s Senate side. What remains is not “retirement” in any sense that means chose to stop. It is did not appear on a ballot, and no file records the difference.

The joined table, exits.csv, carries one row per sitting member per election cycle. Each row names congress, state_abbrev, district_code and election_year. on_house_ballot says whether the member appears anywhere in that cycle’s candidate file. denied and ge_win hold the primary and November verdicts where a verdict exists, and outcome is the classification assembled from the other three. Here is one member, re-elected in one cycle and absent from the next:

Congress State abbrev District code Election year On house ballot Denied Ge win Outcome
112 MI 8 2012 TRUE FALSE TRUE re-elected
113 MI 8 2014 FALSE FALSE FALSE did not seek re-election

Read the two rows. In the first, Mike Rogers of Michigan holds his seat in the 112th Congress; the 2012 candidate file contains him (on_house_ballot is TRUE), his party did not refuse him renomination (denied is FALSE), and he won in November (ge_win is TRUE), so the outcome is re-elected. In the second he holds the same seat in the 113th Congress, and the 2014 candidate file does not contain him at all: on_house_ballot is FALSE, so denied and ge_win have nothing to record. The roster gives him no death year, and the FEC’s Senate file does not list him either, so he falls into the residual: did not seek re-election. That is everything the two files can say. Whether he chose to go, or read the district and decided not to try, is in neither.

Three cleaning decisions had to be made, and each would have produced a confident wrong answer if skipped. First, Voteview issues a member a new identifier when they switch parties mid-Congress, so a switcher reads as a departure and an arrival that never happened. Members are identified here instead by their number in the Biographical Directory of the United States Congress, Congress’s own permanent register of everyone who has served, which survives a switch; that removes 16 duplicate rows. Second, the two files share no key at all, so incumbents — the members already holding a seat — are matched once by name and thereafter by the FEC’s permanent candidate number. Of 3,936 incumbent candidacies, 3931 of 3938 (99.82%) matched, and only 18 needed anything looser than an exact surname.

Third, the FEC’s own incumbent marker is sometimes wrong and sometimes missing, so every marked incumbent must also appear in the roster for that Congress. That check dropped 7 impostor rows and recovered 6 unmarked incumbents by identifier.

One column in the roster quietly stops. occupancy, the only field recording mid-term replacements, is filled through the 114th Congress and empty after it, with no footnote and no warning:

Congress Share of House rows with occupancy filled
110 0.989
112 1.000
113 1.000
114 1.000
115 0.000
116 0.000
117 0.000
118 0.000
119 0.000

That cliff decides the denominator, the bottom number every rate here is divided by. The natural unit would be the 435-member class a general election seats, which is exactly what occupancy would isolate and cannot after 2015. So the denominator throughout is everyone who held a House seat during a Congress: 445 people in the Congress that met in 2023, not 435 seats. Brookings counts the other way, which is one reason the two series run close without ever quite meeting.

Before you read on, commit to a number. Between 2004 and 2022, 790 members left the House. How many of them do you expect were removed by voters — beaten in November by the other party, or refused renomination by their own? Write down a count, or a share of 790, before you look at the figures.

What it says about democracy

The long view first, because the modern House is the strange one.

Figure 1. The share of the House that did not come back, every Congress from 1789 to 2023. An area on a time axis, because the quantity is a share of one chamber measured 118 times at even intervals. The finding is the shape of the whole series: a chamber that once emptied itself, and stopped. The peak is 1841, when 76 percent of the House did not return; the floor since 1900 is 1987, at 8.2 percent.

Period Share who did not return
1789–1830 42.7%
1831–1870 55.1%
1871–1900 43.8%
1901–1940 26.0%
1941–1980 18.4%
1981–2024 15.0%

The fall is the professionalization of Congress. Polsby (1968) described the House acquiring boundaries, an internal career structure and seniority rules — an institution rather than a way station.2 Members stopped going home because there came to be something worth staying for. The question this brief asks starts where that story finishes: once turnover has fallen this far, who does the removing?

Outcome Members Share
Re-elected 3,653 82.2%
Did not seek re-election 387 8.7%
Defeated in the general election 225 5.1%
Ran for the Senate 102 2.3%
Denied renomination 58 1.3%
Died in office 18 0.4%

Those are the 4,443 member-cycles — one sitting member facing one election — from 2004 to 2022. Four out of five members came back. Of the 790 who left, voters removed 283: 225 beaten in November, 58 denied renomination by their own party. The other 507, 64 percent of all departures, faced no voter at all. The modal way to leave the House of Representatives is to stop being a candidate for it.

Figure 2. Every House departure from 2004 to 2022, split at the line. To the left of each year, members who left without standing on a ballot they could lose; to the right, members somebody defeated. The left side totals 507 and the right side 283. Most readers place the primary share far too high: a sitting member is roughly 3.9 times more likely to be beaten in November than to be refused renomination.

The wrong lesson would be that the House is safe and nothing changed. What changed is who does the removing. Compare the earliest and latest quarter centuries of the Brookings series:

1946–1970, per election 2000–2024, per election
Retired 28.2 38.0
Defeated in a primary 8.5 5.8
Defeated in November 31.3 17.5

The two lines swapped. In the first postwar quarter century, November removed about 31 members a cycle and 28 left on their own; in the most recent, November removes 17 and 38 leave. That is the same fact the house-competition brief reaches from the other side: where the November result is a foregone conclusion, the seat empties only when its occupant decides to go.

If departures are decisions, they should respond to circumstances, and they do — in patterns worth telling. The first is the redistricting cycle: after each ten-year census every state redraws its House district lines, and the first election on the new map is the one held in a year ending in 2. Those elections against all the others:

Election Retirements Primary defeats General defeats
First on a new map (years ending in 2) 41.8 12.0 19.8
All other years 34.0 5.2 23.4

Retirements barely move, and primary defeats more than double. The folk theory says a dismantled district produces a retirement; the record says a new map more often puts two members into one district, and two members in one district produce a primary. The clustering is real, and it is in the other column. The second pattern is the wave:

Figure 3. Retirements against seats won or lost, one point per party per election, 1946 to 2022. Retirement counts from Brookings; each party’s seat change computed from the roster. The horizontal bars are the mean seat change within each quarter of the retirement range: 2.9, 2.5, 0.4 and -7.6 seats.

A wave of retirements is a political signal, but only when it is a wave. Below about 21 retirements, a party’s count says nothing about how the election will go; above it, the average party loses 7.6 seats. Across all 78 points the correlation is -0.22, far too loose for the forecasting tool it is treated as on television. And the figure cannot say which way the arrow runs: members reading the polls, or parties recruiting badly in the same bad years, fit it equally well.3

What this brief cannot tell you

It never observes a decision. “Did not seek re-election” is a category of ignorance. It holds the member who wanted to leave and the member who ran out of options, and telling them apart would need a record of intent no agency keeps. Every sentence above about departure being chosen is a sentence about a category that also holds the pushed.

It cannot reach 2024 from the returns. The FEC had published no 2024 compilation when this was written, so the four-way sorting stops at 2022 while the membership series runs to 2023. The Brookings column covers 2024 and is not built from returns.

Its death rule is an approximation. The roster records a death year, not a date, so a member who left in January and died in November cannot be told from one who died in office. The rule used is conservative, and it undercounts.

And two centuries are not one series. A departure in 1841 and one in 2021 are counted identically, and they are not the same event. Multi-member districts, dissolving parties, and House careers that ran through state legislatures all sit inside the steep part of Figure 1.

What you should have learned

Extensions

None of these is answered above, and every one can be answered from the tables the Sources section hands over.

Sources

Data

The data itself

Every figure above is drawn from these tables. They are plain CSV, they open in a spreadsheet, and they are yours to take further.

compare.csv, departures.csv, dropped.csv, exits.csv, exits_by_year.csv, recovered.csv, unmatched.csv, vsoc.csv, vsoc_party.csv

One more file is not data about the subject – it is how this chapter checked its own work: checks.csv, the arithmetic verified before anything was drawn.

Academic literature

Rebuild this data yourself, with an AI assistant
I want to rebuild a public dataset from its original sources, without
any starting files. Please do the following and show your work.

THE FIRST SOURCE. Voteview's congressional member file:
https://voteview.com/static/data/out/members/HSall_members.csv
One CSV, about 6 MB. Each row is one member serving in one Congress,
1789 to the present — the standard compilation of congressional
membership. No account or key is needed.

THE SECOND SOURCE. Federal Election Commission, "Federal Elections",
the agency's biennial compilation of official results. One Excel
workbook per cycle, 2004 through 2024, each pinned by a document id,
for example https://www.fec.gov/documents/5675/federalelections2024.xlsx
It carries primary, runoff and general vote totals for every House
candidate, with an incumbent flag — the only primary-election source
compiled by a federal agency.

THE THIRD SOURCE. Brookings Institution, "Vital Statistics on
Congress", Chapter 2 workbook:
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Chpt-2.xlsx
Table 2-7 counts House incumbents retired, defeated or reelected,
1946-2024 — an independent compilation to check against.

HOW TO DOWNLOAD THE FEC WORKBOOKS. The sheet names differ from edition to
edition, and one of them ships a typo the agency itself made — the
2012 House sheet is titled "Resuts", not "Results". Find sheets by
matching their names loosely, never by assuming a fixed label.

WHAT TO BUILD.
1. From Voteview: every sitting House member in each Congress since
   2003, and whether they appear again after the next election.
2. From the FEC workbooks: for each member who left, the route out —
   retired, beaten in a primary, or beaten in November.
3. The primary-defeat count per cycle, set beside Brookings Table 2-7.

CHECK YOUR WORK. The copies this book used were downloaded in August
2026. If your rebuild matches them, you should find:
- 51,062 rows in the Voteview file, covering Congresses 1 to 119
- 22,156 House candidate rows in the FEC workbooks for 2004-2022
- 58 primary defeats over 2004-2022 by this derivation; Brookings
  counts 61, never differing from it by more than 1 in any year
Voteview regenerates its file continuously and each new Congress adds
rows; a higher row count or a top Congress past 119 means the file
grew, not that you made an error.

  1. U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, text at https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/articlei#section2.↩︎

  2. Nelson W. Polsby, “The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives,” American Political Science Review 62, no. 1 (1968): 144–168, https://www.jstor.org/stable/1953331.↩︎

  3. The first reading is Jacobson’s strategic politicians account, in which experienced candidates and sitting members alike time their decisions to the national climate: Gary C. Jacobson, “Strategic Politicians and the Dynamics of U.S. House Elections, 1946–86,” American Political Science Review 83, no. 3 (1989): 773–793, https://www.jstor.org/stable/1962397; the textbook version is Jacobson and Carson, cited below.↩︎